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external factors such as random interventions, modeled in game theory by a player called Nature. In real-life decision contexts, circumstances outside of the players' control can prematurely end a sequence of cooperative turns, for example if one player is forced to leave, or dies.
To provide a methodological implementation of indefinite game repetitions with random stopping through external forces, random game termination was introduced as an alternative to finitely repeated games (Roth & Murnigham, 1978) . Unlike more traditional games with explicit, finite horizons (e.g., Selten & Stoecker, 1986) , this termination rule involves players being informed of the probability that a further game round will be played but not which particular round will be the last. Random game termination was claimed to avoid an endgame effect. The term "endgame" refers to the final stage in a game of chess, but has also been applied to the analogous stage in an experimental game-the final decisions in the game. The endgame effect, in turn, denotes the behavioral phenomenon that cooperation-even if stable throughout most of the game-suddenly drops when the players can predict that they are approaching the end of the interaction (Andreoni, 1988) . Random game termination was introduced to allow for the study of infinitely extended games (Dal Bó & Fréchette, in press; Fréchette & Yuksel, 2017; Normann & Wallace, 2012) . Based on these methodological advantages, random game termination rules may increase real-life applicability of repeated games, because human social interactions are rarely characterized by complete-information contexts with finite horizons (Dal Bó, 2005; Jiborn & Rabinowicz, 2013) .
Most experimental research using random termination designs has been conducted on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game (RPDG), the iterated version of the dyadic, one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), frequently referred to as the most fundamental example of all social dilemmas Rapoport, Seale, & Colman, 2015; Roth, 1995) . The PD, originally named by Tucker (1950 Tucker ( /2001 , describes a strategic decision context in which two suspects have been arrested for a joint crime. Both individuals have to choose (separately and simultaneously) between selling out the other person (defection) and staying quiet (cooperation). Their sentences will be long if both of them decide to sell out, and shorter if both remain silent, but if one person chooses betrayal while the other stays silent, then the defector will go free and the cooperator will suffer the maximum sentence. Despite describing a specific decision scenario, the PD can be abstracted to model a general strategic dilemma that crops up in many economic, political, and interpersonal interactions. The RPDG refers to decision contexts in which two individuals complete multiple PDs in a sequence. Roth and Murnighan's (1978) first investigation of random termination rules in RPDGs suggested that lower termination probabilities increased cooperation relative to higher probabilities.
More recently, Dal Bó (2005) conducted a comprehensive experiment on RPDGs using three different random termination rules with expected lengths of one, two, and four game rounds respectively. Additionally, they compared these conditions to finite-horizon games with matching numbers of expected game rounds. The results confirmed the earlier findings of Roth and Murninghan (1978) , suggesting that decreasing the likelihood of game termination increased cooperation levels. Furthermore, the results showed that subjects were likely to cooperate more in the infinite-horizon RPDGs than in those of a finite length, even if matched for expected game length. If we interpret the probability of game continuation in such random-termination games as a proxy for the players' (anticipated) relative frequency of rewarding payoffs, then the results are also arguably consistent with the matching law, according to which the relative frequency of responses (in this case, cooperative decisions) closely approximates the relative frequency of reinforcements in concurrent reinforcement schedules (Herrnstein, 1961) .
However, only few studies (e.g., Engle-Warnick & Slonim, 2004) have investigated random termination rules in games other than the RPDG, and no empirical research has studied random termination rules in Rosenthal's (1981) Centipede game (CG), see Figure 1 . In this sequential game with complete and perfect information, two players A and B take turns in deciding between two alternatives: a cooperative GO move that leads the game to continue horizontally across the game tree, and a noncooperative STOP move that terminates the game through an immediate, downward exit move, leaving the defector with a relatively favorable payoff compared to the other player. In the example CG, a GO choice always decreases a player's payoff by three units and increases the co-player's payoff by seven units. In this case, the joint payoffs of the player pair increase linearly from one exit point to another, but exponentially increasing versions are also frequently studied. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the CG, as derived through backward induction (BI) reasoning, is the unconditional STOP move by Player A at the first decision node, even though both players would receive higher individual payoffs following just one cooperative move each (for a discussion of BI in the context of the CG see Aumann, 1995 Aumann, , 1998 Colman, Krockow, Frosch, & Pulford, 2016) . This surprising conclusion of backward induction reasoning is also consistent with probability discounting-the finding that individuals generally prefer smaller certain rewards to larger lower-probability rewards, the effect being most accurately described by a hyperbolic probability discounting function (Green & Myerson, 2004; Myerson, Green & Morris, 2011) .
Fig. 1
Centipede game with a linearly increasing payoff function. The game proceeds from left to right. Two players (A and B) alternate in choosing between cooperative GO moves that continue the interaction by moving horizontally to the right and non-cooperative STOP moves that terminate the game by moving down. The numbers at the bottom and right are payoffs to both players, with those of Player A displayed above those of Player B.
While sharing many features of the RPDG, the CG provides a different decision context and deserves investigation in its own right. In the CG, the decision to defect terminates the entire interaction, and its consequences are irrevocable. Retaliation through strategies such as Tit for Tat is therefore not possible. Furthermore, it is characterized by a sequential, reciprocal move structure that may offer a closer model of many real decision situations than the simultaneous decision context of the RPDG (Krockow, et al., 2016a) . Finally, the payoffs of the standard RPDG remain constant throughout the decision sequence and therefore cannot model the same variety of dynamic incentive structures, including exponentially or linearly increasing payoffs, as the CG.
An example of the game's application to real-life interactive decisions could include two neighboring couples who alternate helping each other with the baby-sitting. Neither of the couples particularly enjoys looking after the other family's badly behaved children, and there is always the possibility that one couple could decide to end the relationship without further reciprocation. Nevertheless, in the long run, both couples benefit from the arrangement, because the cost of performing the chore is less than the benefit to the other couple.
In addition to this social decision-making context, the CG has biological applications, for example modeling certain animal mating behaviors. Hermaphrodite organisms (i.e., organisms with both female and male reproductive organs) such as the hermaphrodite sea bass have been found to distribute costly egg production by taking turns with their mates in laying small batches of eggs. This repeated exchange of small batches of eggs for fertilization-as opposed to the production of a large batch by one individual at a time-helps to prevent mutant sea bass with male reproductive organs only from fertilizing all eggs and swimming off without making a similarly large contribution to reproduction (Binmore, 1998) . The CG thus provides an interesting experimental paradigm to study mutual trust and related topics of reciprocation, altruism, individual versus group benefits, and long-term versus short-term payoff maximization (e.g., Krockow et al. 2016a; Palacios-Huerta & Volij, 2009 ).
Whereas the CG has received increasing attention in the literature, with most empirical studies demonstrating high levels of cooperation and reliable deviations from equilibrium play (e.g., Bornstein et al., 2004; Krockow, Colman, & Pulford, 2016b; Krockow, Pulford, & Colman, 2015; McKelvey & Palfrey 1992) , only short CGs with finite horizons have been investigated so far. The longest CG used in a published, peer-reviewed experiment was Nagel and Tang's (1998) twelve-node game. That game was presented in reduced normal form, which had the additional advantage of assessing all intended exit points in the game-the structure and interdependence of players' decisions in the sequential-move version mean that even the most cooperative player can never reach late exit nodes when paired with an early-defecting co-player. However, although the reduced normal form is likely to provide more accurate assessments of the prevalence of altruism in an experimental sample, it misses out the sequential player interaction characteristic of the standard CG and reduces the length of time invested in each game. It presents a fundamentally different decision problem and may lead to a significantly different behavior (Krockow, et al., 2016a) .
Finally, no research to date has investigated CGs with different termination rules, including random game termination, even though these could provide informative insights into decision-making situations under the risk of premature termination. Hence, there is a need for the investigation of longer CG sequences with a variety of termination rules (Krockow, et al., 2016a) .
The present study investigated CGs with up to 24 moves (twice as long as Nagel & Tang's 1998 version) and linearly increasing payoffs. Additionally, we investigated the effects of four different termination rules, including two novel rules of random termination with increasing and decreasing probabilities of game termination throughout the decision sequence respectively. No study to date appears to have combined random termination rules with finite game horizons. However, the finite design offers an advantage in the CG inasmuch as it allows for the calculation of mean exit points, an index of cooperation widely used in the previous CG literature. Furthermore, as Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich (1997) pointed out, infinitely repeated games are not feasible in practice. Experimental subjects always know that the game will have a finite duration, and the time slot they signed up for provides an effective upper bound. Consequently, no experimental game would ever be expected to be infinite.
The study reported below aimed to compare four CG conditions: A: no random game termination, B: random termination with a constant termination probability, C: random termination with increasing probability, and D: random termination with decreasing probability. These conditions were based on theoretical interest and their direct applicability to different reallife decision contexts.
Consider again the neighborly relationship of alternating childcare support which was presented as an example situation earlier. Random termination of the relationship through external factors beyond the neighbors' control is possible and could follow several different functions. In its simplest form, the probability of the relationship being terminated by an external factor could take on a fixed value. For example, it is possible to imagine a lethal accident cutting the relationship short. Following each cooperative action by either neighbor, an accident could occur by chance, thus rendering either one of the neighboring families unable to engage in further baby-sitting. The probability of such an accident could be fixed (e.g., 1/4) and its value could depend on the general riskiness of the neighbors' lifestyles.
In a slightly different variation of this scenario, one of the families could be living in a rented house from which the landlords could evict them at any time. The landlords may eventually use the property as their own future retirement home or as the prospective house for their children. In this scenario, the landlord's choice would be the external factor potentially ending the neighbors' relationship prematurely. Although the initial probability of the landlord evicting his tenants may be very low, the probability would increase over time.
Finally, consider this third variation of the baby-sitting scenario. The families may have moved to the neighborhood at an early age and with uncertain job prospects. Like many young professionals, they may initially depend on short-term work contracts or insecure temping jobs with zero-hour contracts. Given the initial job insecurity, a long-term stay in the area may be questionable, yielding a high early likelihood of forced relocation. Thus, job insecurity could be another external factor terminating the cooperative interaction between the neighbors. Over time and with increasing work experience, however, job security and financial stability are likely to improve, thus leading to a decreasing probability of the relationship being terminated by environmental factors. Each of the example scenarios maps onto one of our experimental conditions, with the first scenario corresponding to Condition B, the second to Condition C and the third to Condition D.
All conditions of the experiment shared the same maximum game length of 24 nodes but were designed to differ in their expected game lengths as based on the random termination probabilities. While Condition A without random termination had an expected game length of 24 nodes, all random termination conditions had lower expected lengths of approximately 4, 9, and 2 nodes respectively. Previous literature reviewed above (e.g., Dal Bó, 2005) showed that random termination games of shorter expected lengths produced lower cooperation in the RPDG than games with longer expected lengths. Consequently, we hypothesized a similar decrease of cooperation in Centipede game conditions in which the computer was statistically more likely to end the game earlier. More specifically, we used the order of expected game lengths presented above to arrive at our predictions of cooperation levels in the individual conditions. Based on this order, Condition D with an expected length of just over 2 decision nodes was hypothesized to yield the lowest cooperation levels, followed by Condition B and then Condition C. Dal Bó (2005) reported that games with fixed lengths decreased cooperation compared to games with random termination rules. However, their treatment games were matched for expected game lengths. Given that our fixed-length game presented in Condition A was characterized by a comparatively high expected length of 24 decision nodes, we hypothesized that this condition would yield higher levels of cooperation than all random-termination conditions in the experiment.
Method
2.1 Subjects A total of 148 undergraduate students from the University of Leicester with a mean age of 19.34 years (SD = 2.86 years) participated in the experiment (see Table 1 ). All were incentivized with a between-subjects random lottery system. One person per testing session received the payoff from a randomly chosen game completed during the session. The mean cash remuneration of the selected subjects was £14.36 ($18.00). We chose to select one game for payment randomly rather than calculating an average across all games, because previous literature provided evidence that this method prevents subjects from responding to the individual game repetitions merely as parts of one large "supergame" (Bardsley, et al., 2010; Bolle, 1990; Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 1998) . In particular, we wanted to ensure that subjects responded to every game as a separate decision context that could determine their total payoff in the experiment. Selecting only one subject per session for payment is common practice in research on experimental games, and informal feedback from subjects confirmed that they were sufficiently motivated by the chance of winning the money. In Condition C, the probability of game termination by the computer steadily increased from 0 at the first node to 1/2 at the last node. Hence, at the first node the computer never chose to terminate, and at the game's end (i.e., the computer's 24th decision node) it terminated the game in 50% of the cases. Conversely, in Condition D, the probability of game termination by the computer steadily decreased from 1/2 at the first node to 0 at the last node. Hence, at the first node the computer chose to terminate in 50% of the cases, and at the game's end it never terminated. In both Conditions C and D, the mean value of  is 1/4, which is why this value was chosen as the constant termination probability in Condition B. Based on the above probabilities, the expected termination points T by the computer were calculated to be as follows: Condition A, TA = 24.00; Condition B, TB = 4.00, Condition C, TC = 8.99, Condition D, TD = 2.13. The game trees displayed on screen for the different treatment conditions are show in Figure 2 . Detailed plots of the probability functions of games being randomly terminated by the computer at each exit point are provided in Figure 3 .
Fig. 2
Specific Centipede game trees used in the present experiment: (a) Game tree used for Condition A, a long Centipede game with 24 decision nodes and no random termination by the computer; (b) Game tree used for Conditions B, C, and D: a long Centipede game with 24 decision nodes and random termination by the computer (random termination rules varied across the three conditions).
As a general measure of cooperation, the subjects' cooperation rates were calculated by dividing a player's number of GO moves by the total number of moves that player made across all 20 game rounds. In the context of the present experiment, the proportion of GO moves provided a more accurate indication of individual cooperation levels than the mean exit points reported in previous studies (e.g., Krockow, et al., 2016a) , because it took into account the fewer decision opportunities in the three conditions with random termination rules, while also capturing the cooperative moves made in games which were prematurely terminated by the computer.
Additionally, players' STOP probabilities were calculated for each individual decision node to estimate the likelihood of game termination at each point in the game. This was done by dividing the number of players who chose to STOP at each decision node by the total number of players who had reached the respective node.
Fig. 3
Subjects' exit percentages in the experiment and computer STOP probabilities. Graphs show the percentage of experimental games that were terminated by human subjects at each of the 25 exit nodes in our Centipede games. Additionally, the calculated probabilities of games being terminated by the computer are displayed at each node. Graphs A-D correspond to the four conditions with different types of random computer termination.
Materials
The testing sessions were carried out in a large computer laboratory. Each subject was seated at a computer desk, with all desks generously spaced out in the laboratory to avoid any communication between subjects. For the anonymous game interaction, a custom-made webbased game application was used which provided real-time feedback about the subjects' choices, the computer's choices and the current round number. The subjects were presented with the game tree of their respective treatment condition. To visualize the computer's options for random termination in the last three conditions, additional decision nodes with the label C for computer were inserted into the game tree following each player's decision nodes. Several detailed instruction slides explained the payoff function and the random termination rule for the relevant treatment condition. For example, in Condition C (increasing termination probability), the instructions read:
The Computer is programmed to make random choices, prefers neither participant, and gains nothing itself.
The probability that the Computer chooses GO steadily decreases from 1 (at the first circle) to 1/2 (at the last circle). This means that in the beginning it always chooses GO and at the end it chooses GO in 1 out of 2 times.
The probability that the Computer chooses STOP steadily increases from 0 (at the first circle) to 1/2 (at the last circle). This means that in the beginning it never chooses STOP and at the end it chooses STOP in 1 out of 2 times. Subsequent screen displays did not include reminders about the computer's specific termination probabilities at each node. We made this decision despite recent literature suggesting that subjects' responses to linear probability functions may frequently be distorted, with subjects behaving as though the likelihood of events with low probabilities are higher and the likelihood of events with high probabilities lower than they actually are (e.g., Zhang & Maloney, 2012) . Given that the computer's termination probabilities in Conditions C and D either increased or decreased by 1/44 (0.0227) with each of the computer's decision nodes passed, we believed that the small fractions or decimal numbers would impose an even greater challenge to the subjects' adaptive learning than the linear probability functions explained in the instruction slides. The subjects saw eight player nodes at a time, and the display shifted by eight nodes once the game continued beyond the eighth node. The display shifted again to the game's final set of eight decision nodes if the subjects reached the 16th node. We chose to shift the game tree by eight nodes at a time, because a previous experiment by Krockow, Colman, and Pulford (2017) suggested that subjects struggled with a constantly moving window that always displayed the next eight decision nodes. Additionally, the experiment included a paper-based comprehension test to check for the understanding of the game's basic features as well as the different termination rules.
Procedure
For each of the four conditions, two testing sessions were conducted, each of which contained between 16 and 22 subjects and took approximately 50 minutes to complete (see Table 1 ). In each testing session, all subjects experienced the same condition, and they were informed about this fact. The subjects were instructed to focus only on their own materials and computer screens, and the experimenters checked that these rules were followed at all times across all testing sessions.
After completing the consent form, subjects were presented with detailed, animated instructions on their computer screens. They could work through the slides in their own time, and were given the opportunity to ask questions in private. Then, they were asked to fill in a short comprehension test. The experimenters checked all responses and corrected any misunderstandings. Subsequently, the experiment was started. The computer randomly assigned all subjects to a player role in which they remained for the entire testing session. The subjects were ignorant of the identity of their co-players, and they were randomly re-paired after each game round (i.e., after each game they completed). The re-pairing of players was randomized with replacement, meaning that the ideal of perfect stranger matching (i.e., never encountering the same co-player twice) was not achieved. However, given the relatively large size of our testing sessions (compared to other CG research including Rapoport et al., 2003) , we do not believe this to be a problem. The web application provided them with real-time feedback about all the moves made and on the outcome of each game. Once each subject had completed 20 rounds of Centipede games, one subject was drawn at random for the lottery prize. The winner received his or her outcome (in pounds sterling) of one randomly selected game which they completed during the session.
Results
The proportion of games ending at each exit node for the different conditions are shown in Figures 3 and 4 . Figure 3 displays the proportions of games terminated by human players, and plots these results against the probability functions of random computer termination. Figure 4 As can be seen in Figure 4 , a large proportion of games in the treatment conditions with random computer stopping were in fact terminated by the computer. In Condition B (constant δ) this proportion amounted to 0.65, in Condition C (increasing δ) it was 0.49, and in Condition D (decreasing δ) it was 0.68. Hence, in Condition C more than half of the games were terminated by the subjects, whereas in the other two treatment conditions with random termination, only around a third of the games were ended by either of the human subjects.
Taking a closer look at Figure 3 , the distributions of subjects' exit moves show marked differences across treatment conditions. Although in Condition A (no random termination) more than 50% of the games were stopped after the 20th exit point, not a single game in the other treatment conditions was stopped after the 20th exit point. In Condition B (constant δ) , games stopped by subjects followed a near normal distribution, with most game exits occurring at the third or fourth decision node and no game continuing beyond the eighth decision node. In Condition C (increasing δ), the pattern also resembled a bell-shaped distribution but the dispersion was larger. Most subjects exited this treatment condition at Node 6, but some games continued for longer, with 19 being the latest exit point reached. Finally, the exit distribution of Condition D (decreasing δ), showed an almost linear decrease across exit points. The majority of games (40%) that were exited by human subjects stopped at Node 1, 30% stopped at Node 2, 20% stopped at Node 3, and the final 10% stopped at Nodes 4, 5, 6 and 7. Interestingly, the exit distributions described above follow the probability function of game terminations by the computer. In Condition A with zero possibility of computer termination throughout the game, subjects' defection levels remain very low across many decision nodes before suddenly spiking close to the game's end. In Conditions B, C, and D, which were characterized by high game termination probabilities in the beginning, a much higher percentage of games were stopped at early exit nodes by the subjects. Particularly Condition D (decreasing δ) shows a close match between the subjects' exit distributions and the computers' linearly decreasing termination probabilities.
The overview of mean exit points is complemented by the display of players' conditional STOP probabilities at each node (see Figure 5) , showing percentages of individuals who reached each decision node and decided to defect at that node. In Condition A (no random termination), STOP probabilities are very low until Node 21, from which point they steadily increase toward a mode of 100% at Node 25. In Condition B (constant δ), STOP probabilities are below 10% on Node 1, but increase almost steadily until Node 7, beyond which no game in this condition continued: the modal STOP probability was above 40% at Node 6. In Condition C (increasing δ), most STOP probabilities of subjects stayed below 20%, and the modal STOP probability was found at Node 19, where a third of all subjects stopped. Finally, in Condition D (decreasing δ), a small bell-curve of STOP probabilities was found: starting with a percentage of approximately 10% at Node 1, STOP probabilities rise to almost 30% at Node 5 and then begin to fall again.
Fig. 5
Subjects' STOP probabilities at each of the 24 decision nodes. Based on the experimental results, the graphs display calculated conditional probabilities (in percentages) of a subject choosing "STOP" assuming that they have reached the respective decision point. Graphs A-D correspond to the four conditions with different rules for random computer termination.
A Kruskal-Wallis H test was conducted to compare the normalized cooperation rates (i.e., the proportion of GO moves per total moves) per subject across conditions. Significant differences were found, χ 2 (3) = 14.95, p = .005, with a mean rank cooperation rate of 89.40 for Condition A, 84.49 for Condition C, 59.87 for Condition D, and 59.85 for Condition B (for mean cooperation rates see also Table 2 ). Pairwise comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests showed that Condition A (no random termination) with a mean rank of 43.95 had a significantly higher cooperation rate than Condition B (constant δ) with a mean rank of 29.91 (U = 422, p < .005, r = .33). Condition A also had a significantly higher cooperation rate with a mean rank of 43.78 than Condition D with a mean rank of 30.12 (decreasing δ) (U = 429, p < .05, r = .32). Furthermore, Condition C (increasing δ) with a mean rank of 44.18 was found to have a significantly higher cooperation rate than Condition B (constant δ) with a mean rank of 29.65 (U = 413, p < .005, r = .34). Condition C also had a significantly higher cooperation rate with a mean rank of 42.99 than Condition D (decreasing δ) with a mean rank of 31.04 (U = 460.5, p < .05, r = .28). The mean percentages of GO moves per game round for all four conditions are displayed in Figure 6 . Only the graphs of Condition A (no random termination) and Condition C (increasing δ) show discernible temporal trends, indicating an increase of cooperation over rounds. In Condition A, the mean percentage of GO moves increased from a value of approximately 89% in Round 1 to a value of approximately 96% in Round 20. Time series analyses confirmed the learning pattern apparent in Condition A. The SPSS Modeler identified an exponential smoothing Holt linear trend model with parameters of α (level smoother) = 0.20 and γ (trend smoother) = 1.00, indicating a linearly increasing score pattern. The stationary R 2 model fit statistic was calculated to estimate the model's goodness of fit. With an R 2 value of .75, the model can explain approximately 75% of the variance in the data and indicates a superior fit compared to a simple mean model used as a baseline for comparison. Additionally, the Ljung-Box statistic Q was calculated to test whether the model was correctly specified. The value of Q(16) = 18.38, (p = .302) showed that no significant temporal structure in the data set was unaccounted for by the Holt linear model identified.
Fig. 6
Mean cooperation rates (percentage of GO moves) for each of the 20 game rounds. Graphs A-D correspond to the four conditions with different types of random computer termination. Black lines show the observed values (i.e., the data obtained experimentally). Dotted lines show the fit line indicating the temporal data trend.
In Condition C, the mean percentage of GO moves increased from a value of approximately 80% in Round 1 to values above 90% in later rounds. Again, time series analyses identified an exponential smoothing Holt linear trend model with parameters of α (level smoother) = 0.11 and γ (trend smoother) = 2.281E-6, indicating a linearly increasing score pattern. With a stationary R 2 value of .72, the model can explain approximately 72% of the variance of the data. Additionally, the Ljung-Box statistic Q was calculated; the value of Q(16) = 12.34, (p = .72) showed that no significant temporal structure in the data set was unaccounted for by our model.
Conditions B (constant δ) and D (decreasing δ) did not show any temporal trends. For both conditions, the SPSS Modeler identified ARIMA (0,0,0), a model indicating nothing but white noise in the data across rounds and suggesting that no learning took place.
Discussion
This experiment aimed to extend previous research on repeated games with random termination rules by providing the first investigation of CGs with varying termination rules and long decision sequences. In particular, we used 24-node finite-horizon games and tested for effects of different rules of random computer termination (no random termination, constant, increasing, and decreasing termination probability) on human cooperation levels. All treatment conditions with random computer termination were controlled for average termination probability across the 24 decision nodes (the mean probability was 1/4 for each condition). However, the conditions varied regarding their expected computer termination points, ranging from TD = 2.13 to TC = 8.99. Our results revealed large differences between the four treatment conditions, with subjects' mean exit points varying across conditions. Condition A (no random termination) yielded significantly higher mean exit points than Condition C (increasing δ), and both of these conditions yielded significantly higher means than Conditions B (constant δ) and D (decreasing δ). Matching the subjects' mean exit points with the respective expected game lengths (as based on the random computer termination rules), the values of mean exit points follow the same order as the values of the expected game length. More specifically, games with a higher expected game length were stopped later than those with a lower expected game length. Additionally, inspection of results showed a close match between the percentages of subjects' exit moves per decision node and the random termination probability associated with the respective node. This finding is in line with our hypotheses, and it supports previous experimental results (e.g., Dal Bó, 2005; Roth & Murnighan, 1978) .
Interestingly, however, the decrease of the mean exit points was less severe than what could have been expected from the drastic decrease of expected game length across conditions. For example, although Condition A's expected game length of 24 nodes was 12 times higher than the expected game length of Condition D (2 nodes), the mean exit point of subjects in Condition A was only 7.07 times higher than in Condition D. This indicates that cooperativeness did not increase proportionately with the expected length of the games.
Indeed, the comparison of subjects' cooperation rates across treatment conditions confirmed this finding. Cooperation rates were surprisingly high across all conditions, with 98% of subjects choosing GO more than half of the time, and more than 10% always choosing GO. Significant differences in cooperation rates between conditions became apparent, but these differences did not follow the data patterns previously identified when using mean exit points as dependent variable in the analyses. Condition A (no random termination) and Condition C (increasing δ) yielded comparable mean cooperation rates of approximately .92. Condition B (constant δ) produced a mean rate of approximately .86, and Condition D (decreasing δ) generated the lowest cooperation rates (.80). However, due to comparatively high variances within groups, the only significant differences were found between Condition D on the one hand and Conditions A and C on the other hand, indicating that only Condition D, with the lowest expected game length TD = 2.13, resulted in a significant decrease in subjects' cooperativeness compared to the control condition without random termination.
An explanation for the large variances within groups could be the importance of individual differences influencing cooperation rates. Although the treatment condition had an impact on behavior, other-regarding behavioral propensities (e.g., cooperative social value orientations) may have accounted for some of the variance (e.g., Krockow et al., 2016b; Pulford, Krockow, Colman, & Lawrence, 2016) . Additionally, numeracy skills could have had an impact on decision making. The disproportionally large number of cooperative choices in conditions with shorter expected game lengths could be explained by the subjects' inability to anticipate likely computer exit points from the termination probabilities. In future investigations, any confounding effects of numeracy and mathematical ability could be reduced by informing subjects about the expected game length of their condition before the start of each experiment.
A limitation of the present study's research design concerns the simultaneous changes to both the expected game length and the computer's termination rules across conditions. Based on the present design, it is not possible to be certain of the reasons for differences in the cooperation rates across the different games, but we believe that they are jointly influenced by expected game length and termination rules. Future research could extend this study by controlling treatment conditions for the expected game length (rather than the mean termination probability), while comparing different termination rules. Additionally, it is possible that an increase in stimulus control could be achieved by announcing the computer's termination probabilities at each stage of the game.
When examining temporal data trends, it appears that learning occurred only in the treatment conditions with longer expected game lengths and either no random game termination or increasing probability of termination. In the standard 24-node game, cooperation rates increased linearly with increasing experience in the game, reaching very high rates of over 95% in the final game rounds. Hence, learning occurred in the opposite direction of equilibrium play. Similarly, in the condition with increasing termination probabilities, initial cooperation rates started at 83.3% and many reached percentages higher than 90 toward the final game rounds. This is an interesting finding, as the majority of experimental CG investigations reported decreases in cooperation over rounds (e.g., McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Rapoport, Stein, Parco, & Nicholas, 2003) . Our learning effects could be explained by the linear payoff function and comparatively low risk associated with each GO move in Condition A of the present study. Another reason may be the greater game length, which offers more opportunities for reciprocal cooperation (Krockow et al., 2016a) .
Taken together, the findings suggest that CGs with far and finite horizons and linearly increasing payoff functions generate high levels of cooperation that increase with higher experience in the game. When these games are combined with different rules of random game termination by the computer, the subjects' mean exit points typically decrease. However, subjects' cooperativeness as assessed by the more accurate measure of cooperation rates may be affected only in conditions with very extreme conditions such as very low expected game lengths. In this experiment, only Condition D, with decreasing termination probability and an expected game length of approximately two decision nodes, led to a significant decrease in cooperativeness relative to the control condition. Future research should investigate the effects that individual differences may have on cooperation levels in CGs and RPDGs with random termination rules. Interesting variables to investigate could be social value orientation and general numeracy skills. To increase external validity of the current study design further, followup research could dispense with the formal rules communicated to experimental subjects, because many real-life choices with probabilistic consequences are not presented with explicit probabilities. We tend instead in some situations to adapt our behavior to probabilities through learning. An experiment with learned instead of explicit probabilities, would shift the experimental focus from rule-governed behavior (or instructional control) to a focus on contingency-shaped behavior (learned behavior) (e.g., Cerutti, 1989) , which could correspond more closely to everyday experience.
Applying the findings of our abstract game context to the previous real-life examples of different baby-sitting scenarios presented in the Introduction, it appears that mutual trust and reciprocal cooperation are common in prolonged decision contexts marked by a personal risk due to the other person's possible defection. Cooperation is maintained even under circumstances of increased uncertainty including the relationship's likely termination through an external force beyond the decision makers' control. Only very extreme conditions, such as an expected interaction length of only two encounters, appear to lead to a significant decrease of cooperation. Fig. A1 . Examples of individual participant behavior. For each condition, decisions of one representative participant displaying typical behavior for that condition is shown. The exit points of these participants are displayed across the 20 game rounds. Those games terminated by the individual participant are marked by black circular shapes. Those games terminated by the other participant are marked by circular shapes with the letter "O". Those games terminated by the computer (only applicable in Conditions B, C, and D) are marked by a square shapes with the letter "C".
